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CONDO ASSOCIATIONS-NEW COP ON THE
BEAT: MARTINEZ V. WOODMAR IV
CONDOMINIUMS HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally in property law, landlords were shielded from
tort liability due to the law's treatment of a lease as a sale' and
the doctrine of caveat emptor.' Over time, exceptions to the
nonliability rule developed which essentially eroded the general
rule. Some jurisdictions became dissatisfied with the nonliabil-
1 See, e.g., Gabaldon v. Erisa Mortgage Co., 949 P.2d 1193, 1203-04 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1997) (stating that because a lease was treated as a sale at common law, a
landlord escapes tort liability for harm suffered during tenancy), cert. granted, 949
P.2d 282 (N.M. 1997). See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 63, at 434-35 (5th ed. 1984); Olin L. Browder, The Taming
of a Duty-The Tort Liability of Landlords, 81 MICH. L. REV. 99, 101 (1982) (noting
that a landlord's tort liability was derived from property law's notion that a tenant
effectively became owner of the leased premises). Landlord immunity had its origins
in feudal property law. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074
(D.C. Cir. 1970). The treatment of a lease as a conveyance of real property was logi-
cal at a time when the country was primarily an agrarian society in which lessees
were concerned with the land itself. See id. The lessee, as "owner" of an interest in
an estate, became "subject to all of the responsibilities of one in possession, to those
who enter[ed] upon the land and those outside of its boundaries." KEETON ET AL., §
63, at 434. As a result, the burden of maintaining the land was placed upon the les-
see. See, e.g., Borders v. Roseberry, 532 P.2d 1366, 1368 (Kan. 1975).
2 Caveat emptor, "let the buyer beware," or "caveat lessee," further protected
the lessor from liability despite any defects in the property at the time the parties
entered into the lease. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 63, at 434-35. See, e.g.,
Old Town Dev. Co. v. Langford, 349 N.E.2d 744, 760 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976) (noting
that caveat emptor applies to the relationship between a landlord and tenant absent
any fraudulent behavior or dealings); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 69 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1973) (explaining that as a buyer of land, a tenant is subject to the rule of ca-
veat emptor); see also Browder, supra note 1, at 101 (noting that there were no im-
plied warranties or duties at the time of delivery regarding the condition of the
land).
3 See Pagelsdorf v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 284 N.W.2d 55, 59 (Wis. 1979);
KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 63, at 435-46. The Supreme Court of Kansas, in Bor-
ders v. Roseberry, summarized the six traditional exceptions to the nonliability rule.
See Borders, 532 P.2d at 1369-72. First, liability may be imposed upon the landlord
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ity doctrine altogether and instead imposed upon the landlord a
general duty to exercise ordinary care.4 For the most part, the
expansion of landlord liability was directly related to physical
defects on the premises.5 In the past few decades, however,
courts have had to determine the liability of a possessor of land
for criminal acts of third parties occurring on the premises.6
Various theories and competing justifications have been utilized
by the courts in finding a landlord negligent for failure to protect
tenants from third party criminal attacks.! A new issue facing
courts today is the liability, if any, of a condominium association
for criminal acts of third parties.8 Courts have had to grapple
with applying existing law to a new form of ownership, namely,
for latent conditions known to the lessor. See id. at 1369. Second, liability may stem
from injuries caused by dangerous conditions outside the premises. See id. at 1369-
70. Third, an affirmative duty to use reasonable care to inspect the premises arises
when the lessor leases the premises for admission to the public. See id. at 1370.
Fourth, a lessor may be liable for dangerous conditions on a part of the premises
that remains under the lessor's control which the lessee is permitted to use. See id.
at 1370-71. Fifth, tort liability may follow where a lessor contracts to repair and the
disrepair causes injury. See id. at 1371-72. Finally, liability may be imposed when
the lessor is negligent in making repairs. See id. at 1372.
4 See Sargent v. Ross, 308 A.2d 528, 532, 534 (N.H. 1973) (criticizing the general
nonliability doctrine for its inflexibility and instead, imposing a duty upon the
landlord to use ordinary care); Pagelsdorf, 284 N.W.2d at 59 (stating that public
policy supports imposing a duty to use reasonable care upon the landlord with re-
spect to maintaining the land).
5 See Cramer v. Balcor Property Management, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 1222, 1225
(D.S.C. 1994) (stating that with respect to the "common areas exception," South
Carolina has only imposed liability for injuries resulting from a dangerous physical
condition of the premises); Cooke v. Allstate Management Corp., 741 F. Supp. 1205,
1211 (D.S.C. 1990) (same); Sargent, 308 A.2d at 531 (noting that the duty of reason-
able care pertains to maintaining the premises); Pagelsdorf, 284 N.W.2d at 59
(same).
6 See, e.g., Washington v. United States Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., 953 F.
Supp. 762, 773 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (stating that a possessor of land may be liable for
third party criminal acts when the acts occur on the leased premises and when they
are foreseeable). See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 63, at 442-43; B.A.
Glesner, Landlords as Cops: Tort, Nuisance & Forfeiture Standards Imposing Li-
ability on Landlords for Crime on the Premises, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 679, 684-
789 (1992) (explaining that the issue of determining liability for criminal acts of
third parties stemmed from a concern for residential safety and efforts to improve
the uality of housing).
See discussion infra Part II.
See Morgan v. 253 East Delaware Condominium Ass'n, 595 N.E.2d 36, 38-39
(Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (holding that a condominium association was not liable for
plaintiffs injuries resulting from the criminal acts of another because of the absence
of a special relationship).
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the condominium.9 Recently, in Martinez v. Woodmar IV Con-
dominiums Homeowners Ass'n,'° the Supreme Court of Arizona
held that, in general, a condominium association is analogous to
a landlord with respect to the common areas and, therefore, the
association has a duty of due care to maintain the physical con-
dition of the premises as well as protect the unit owners and
guests from dangerous activities, including criminal acts, on the
premises. "
In Martinez, the guest of a unit owner was shot by a gang
9 See Gerber v. Town of Clarkstown, 356 N.Y.S.2d 926, 928 (Sup. Ct. 1974)
(holding that a condominium is not considered a subdivision and therefore statutes
allowing review of subdivisions do not apply to condominiums). See generally Eric T.
Freyfogle, A Comprehensive Theory of Condominium Tort Liability, 39 U. FLA. L.
REV. 877, 878 (1988) (noting that although statutes have been enacted with respect
to condominium creation and regulation, the statutes fail to adequately address tort
liability); John M. Payne, The Condominium as Landlord-Determining Tort Liabil-
ity, 15 REAL EST. L.J. 365 (1987) (discussing whether a condominium board and its
directors should be treated like a landlord for purposes of imposing a duty and po-
tential tort liability); Phyllis M. Rubinstein & William A. Walsh, Jr., Little House of
Horrors: May a Condominium Association Be Held Liable for Failure to Provide
Adequate Security or Maintenance in the Common Areas?, 22 U. RICH. L. REV. 127,
128 (1988) (noting that the unique nature of the condominium structure presents
legal issues that are often complex and difficult to solve).
Arizona defines a condominium as "real estate, portions of which are desig-
nated for separate ownership and the remainder of which is designated for common
ownership solely by the owners of the separate portions." ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
33-1202(10) (West 1990). Purchasers of individual units of the condominium own
their units in fee simple. See WAYNE S. HYATr, CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNER
ASSOCIATION PRACTICE: COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW §1.05(b)(1), at 14 (2d ed.
1988). The common elements, such as parking lots used by the owners, meeting
rooms, etc., are owned by all the unit owners as tenants in common. See Freyfogle,
supra, at 885.
If courts are assessing the alleged negligence of a condominium association, it is
presupposed that an association can be sued. See generally id. (discussing competing
models of ownership and issues of liability). The seminal case establishing that a
condominium can be sued is White v. Cox, 95 Cal. Rptr. 259 (Ct. App. 1971). In
White, the court first found that "unincorporated associations are now entitled to
general recognition as separate legal entities," and thus, a member can bring a tort
cause of action against the association. Id at 261. Based on the similarities between
a condominium and an unincorporated association, the court determined that a con-
dominium association can be liable to its unit owners for tortious conduct. See id. at
263. Today, most states have passed statutes expressly permitting a tort action to
be brought against a condominium association. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-
1251 (West 1990). Conversely, condominium associations may also bring a lawsuit.
See, e.g., Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc. v. Seawatch at Marathon Condominium
Ass'n, 658 So. 2d 922, 924 (Fla. 1994).
'0 941 P.2d 218, 222-24 (Ariz. 1997).
" Martinez, 941 P.2d at 222-24.
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member in the parking lot of the condominium complex.' The
gang frequently congregated in the condominium's parking lot
prior to the incident."3 The association had previously employed
two security guards to patrol the complex, however, due to
budget constraints, the association could only afford to keep one
guard on duty. 4 Generally, the security guard on duty would
disperse the gang. 5 On the day in question, while the plaintiff
was checking his car in the condominium's parking lot, an argu-
ment arose between the plaintiff and the gang, resulting in the
plaintiff being shot. 6 The shooting took place approximately one
hour before the security guard was to come on duty. 7 The
plaintiff brought a negligence action against the condominium
association claiming that no injury would have occurred but for
the lack of security. 8 The trial court found that there was no
special relationship' 9 between the plaintiff and defendant that
would impose a duty upon the defendant to protect the plaintiff
from harm.2" The court of appeals affirmed summary judgment
for the defendant on the same grounds."
In reversing summary judgment for the association, the Su-
preme Court of Arizona, conceding that no special relationship
existed,' nevertheless held that the association was under a
12 See id. at 219.
'" See id. While the court stated that the gang was known to participate in ile-
gal activities such as drug dealing, the opinion fails to mention whether there had
been any prior shootings in the condominium complex. See id.
14 See id.
15 See id.
'6 See id.
17 See id.
'8 See id.
19 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965) which states in relevant
part that "[t]here is no duty... to control the conduct of a third person as to pre-
vent him from causing physical harm to another unless ... (b) a special relation ex-
ists between the actor and the other which gives to the other a right to protection."
Id.
20 See Martinez v. Woodmar IV Homeowners Condominiums Ass'n, 941 P.2d
218, 219 (Ariz. 1997).
21 See Martinez v. Woodmar V Homeowners Condominium Ass'n, 930 P.2d 485,
488 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997), rev'd, 941 P.2d 218 (Ariz. 1997). Both the trial court and
the court of appeals based their decisions on the status of the plaintiff. As "a social
guest/licensee... he did not have the type of special relationship with Woodmar
which would impose on it a duty to protect him from harm caused by third parties."
Id. at 486 (citation omitted).
22 See Martinez, 941 P.2d at 220. The court did not base its decision, however, on
the status of the plaintiff. See id. at 219 n.1, 220.
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duty of care to make the premises safe from criminal activity.'
Before reaching its ultimate conclusion that the association owed
a duty of care to the plaintiff, the court established certain nec-
essary bases underlying its decision. First, the court established
that the association owed a duty to a unit owner similar to the
duty owed by a landlord to a tenant.2 The court found that the
duty also extended to those using the common areas with con-
sent.' Control over the common areas was a major factor in the
determination.26 The court then held that a condominium asso-
ciation has a duty to maintain the safety of the common areas
with respect to the physical condition and to dangerous activities
on the premises.'
According to the court, the relationship between a condomin-
ium association and its unit owners, and/or those within the
common areas with consent, "imposed an obligation on [the as-
sociation] to take reasonable precautions for the latter's safety."8
This duty was imposed without regard to whether criminal activ-
23 See id. at 222, 224.
24 See id. at 221. (relying on Frances T. v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 723 P.2d
573 (Cal. 1986)). The court also relied on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
section 360, which states in relevant part that a "possessor of land" who retains con-
trol over part of the land which the lessee is entitled to use may be subject to liabil-
ity "for physical harm caused by a dangerous condition... if the lessor by the exer-
cise of reasonable care could have discovered the condition" and made the area safe.
Id. at 220 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 360) In a footnote, the court
also referred to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY section 17.3 (1977) which
states essentially the same rule as RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS section 360.
See Martinez, 941 P.2d at 221 n.4.
2, See Martinez, 941 P.2d at 221.
2 See id From the court's perspective, "if the association owes no duty of care
over the common areas of the property, no one does because no one else possesses
the ability to cure defects in the common area." Id. The court stated that the law
would not recognize such a lack of responsibility. See id. Moreover, Arizona law ex-
pressly states that a condominium "association is responsible for maintenance, re-
pair and replacement of the common elements." ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1247(A)
(West 1990).
7 See Martinez, 941 P.2d. at 222. In reaching this conclusion, the court stated
that a condominium is like a business and as such, can be liable under RE.
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS section 344. See id. at 222 n.7. Section 344 imposes
liability on "[a] possessor of land who holds it open to the public" and fails to use
reasonable care to protect guests from, inter alia, intentional acts of a third party
for which the possessor could have prevented. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
344. The court also found support in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY sec-
tion 17.3 cmt. a. See Martinez, 941 P.2d at 222.
Martinez, 941 P.2d at 223. This relationship alone seemed to justify imposi-
tion of a duty. See id.
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ity was foreseeable. 9 With respect to dangerous activities, the
court stated that "[the category of danger neither creates nor
eradicates duty; it only indicates what conduct may be reason-
able to fulfill the duty."3 ' Thus, according to the court, foresee-
ability does "not dictate the existence of duty."3'
It is submitted that the Supreme Court of Arizona erred in
its holding that a condominium association owes a duty to unit
owners and guests to make the premises safe from criminal ac-
tivity without regard to foreseeability. The court failed to con-
duct an examination of the law and various issues as decided by
other jurisdictions. While it is conceded that a condominium as-
sociation functions as a landlord with respect to the common ar-
eas, this comparison alone neither dictates nor justifies imposing
a general duty on the condominium association. The court's
analysis and conclusion with respect to duty is flawed and con-
trary to the law in virtually every other jurisdiction. Imposing a
general duty upon a condominium association without a consid-
eration of foreseeability expands the potential liability of an as-
sociation beyond any reasonable boundary. By doing so, the
Martinez court failed to acknowledge the unique form and char-
acteristics of a condominium and its association.
This Comment examines the various bases for imposing a
duty on a condominium association to protect unit owners and
guests from criminal activities of third parties. Part I discusses
how courts have begun to treat a condominium association as a
landlord with respect to the common areas of the complex. Us-
ing Part I as an underlying foundation, Part II discusses and
analyzes the various competing theories for imposing a duty to
protect upon landlords, and where applicable, condominium as-
sociations. This Comment criticizes imposing a general duty on
a condominium association due to its unique form and, rather,
proposes that a duty arises when the condominium association
has voluntarily assumed a duty or the association's acts or
omissions foreseeably cause or enhance criminal activity on the
premises.
2See id.
30 Id. The court stated that it "disapprove[d] of attempts to equate the concepts
of duty with specific details of conduct." Id.
8' Id. Rather, in Arizona, foreseeability will only define the limits of an already
existing duty. See id.
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I. CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION AS LANDLORD
In the past few decades, this country has experienced a tre-
mendous growth in condominium ownership." Because of the
condominium's relatively brief existence, the issue of the tort li-
ability of a condominium association has challenged our legal
system.' Although the condominium itself is a statutory crea-
ture,34 most statutes do not address the tort liability of the asso-
ciation.'
The first case discussing whether a condominium association
should be held to the same standard as a landlord with respect
to a criminal attack by a third party was Frances T. v. Village
Green Owners Ass'n. In Frances T., a unit owner was raped
and robbed in her condominium unit."' At the time of the inci-
dent, the plaintiffs exterior lights, which were maintained by
the association, were not operating."8 In determining this case of
first impression, the Supreme Court of California reasoned that
"for all practical purposes" the condominium association acted
32 See, e.g., RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 633.6, at 646
(Patrick J. Rohan ed., 1998) (1968) (describing condominium growth in North and
South America); Freyfogle, supra note 9, at 877-79 (explaining that since Puerto
Rico's enabling statute was passed in 1958, the popularity of condominiums has
continued to grow).
See Smith v. King's Grant Condominium, 614 A.2d 261, 263 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1992) (stating that condominium law is a new and rapidly growing area and tort law
has yet to catch up with its growth), affd, 640 A.2d 1276 (Pa. 1994); Rubinstein &
Walsh, supra note 9, at 128 (noting that the unique form of ownership has posed
"some perplexing problems" for the courts).
14 See Freyfogle, supra note 9, at 878 (stating that every state now has enabling
statutes for condominium formation); Rubenstein & Walsh, supra note 9, at 127
(same).
5See Dutcher v. Owens, 647 S.W.2d 948, 951 (Tex. 1983) (noting that the Texas
Condominium Act is "silent as to tort liability"); Reedeker v. Salisbury, 952 P.2d
577, 584-86 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (stating that the Condominium Act did not address
the issue of tort liability and that tort liability could only be found if a plaintiff
proved intentional misconduct under a separate act); see also Freyfogle, supra note
9, at 878 (explaining that many statutes are silent as to tort liability and those that
do address the issue do so in an ambiguous and confusing manner).
3" 723 P.2d 573 (Cal. 1986). The Supreme Court of California had to answer the
additional question of whether the board of directors could be sued for negligence.
Ultimately, the court held that directors can be personally liable to third parties if
they participated in tortious conduct resulting in physical injury, independent of
whether the corporation or association was liable. See id. at 580.
"See id. at 574. Six months prior to the rape and robbery, plaintiffs unit had
been burglarized. See id. at 575.
:' See id. at 574.
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like a landlord."9 The court emphasized the control the associa-
tion had over the common areas and elements40 and the overall
purpose of an association in general.41 Similarly, the Supreme
Court of Arizona found that with respect to the common areas, a
condominium association is analogous to a landlord.42 Other ju-
risdictions have since followed California's lead on this particu-
lar issue.43 Based on certain similarities between a condominium
association and a landlord, especially with respect to the issue of
control in the common areas, this analogy seems reasonable and
appropriate in many circumstances. 44
II. DETERMINING DUTY
American jurisprudence has followed the notion that, gen-
"Id. at 576.
40 See id. at 576-77. Ordinarily, control by itself has "no meaning absent an es-
tate in the property in question." VINCENT DI LOREzNo, THE LAW OF CONDO-
MINIUMS AND COOPERATIVES § 1.02[2][b], at 1-9 (1990). Whereas a landlord owns
the common areas, technically, the association does not "own" the common ele-
ments. See id. However, as a result of the unit owners lack of control, the associa-
tion is treated by the courts as a "de facto owner." Id. at 1-10.
In Frances T., the unit owner "had no 'effective control over the operation of the
common areas.' " Frances T., 723 P.2d at 577 (quoting White v. Cox, 95 Cal. Rptr.
259, 263 (Ct. App. 1971). As evidence, the Frances T. court pointed out that when
the plaintiff attempted to improve her outside lighting on her own, the association
forced her to stop because they had exclusive control over the common elements
which included exterior lights. See Frances T., 723 P.2d at 579.
41 See Frances T., 723 P.2d at 578. The condominium association does not
merely " 'mow[] lawns,' " but instead, "'the association in reality has a far broader
and more businesslike purpose.' " Id. at 577 (quoting O'Connor v. Village Green
Owners Ass'n., 662 P.2d 427, 431 (1983)).
42 See Martinez, 941 P.2d at 221. This holding was based on the association's
exclusive control over the area. See id.
'3 See Pamela W. v. Millsom, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690 (Ct. App. 1994) (discussing
the liability of a condominium association in terms of landlord-tenant law); Morgan
v. 253 East Del. Condominium Ass'n, 595 N.E.2d 36 (Ill. 1992) (same).; Czerwinski
v. Sunrise Point Condominium, 540 So. 2d 199 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (per cu-
riam) (same); see also Rubinstein & Walsh, supra note 9, at 131 (stating that in de-
termining condominium association liability, courts have relied upon doctrine es-
tablished at common law in the context of landlords and possessors of land).
" Differences between a condominium association and a landlord do exist, how-
ever. While a landlord generates profit from the arrangements with the tenants, an
association rarely does. See Katharine Rosenberry, Theories on Liability, in
CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATION LITIGATION: COMMUNITY ASSO-
CIATION LAW §§ 3, 59, 73 (Wayne S. Hyatt et al. eds., 1987). A landlord's goals gen-
erally differ from those of the tenant. See Freyfogle, supra note 9, at 888. It has also
been argued that in the context of criminal attacks by third parties, it is ambiguous
whether "condominium and landlord-tenant labels truly signify the same thing."
Payne, supra note 9, at 368.
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erally, there is no duty to protect another from harm caused by a
third party.45 Every rule, however, has its exceptions. In the
context of condominium associations and landlord-tenant law,
liability for injuries caused by third party criminal attacks may
be based on one or more of a variety of theories.46 Plaintiffs have
been most successful in bringing negligence suits.47 Within neg-
ligence actions however, there is no common theme with respect
to the ways in which courts analyze the existence of a duty.
4
Determining whether a condominium association or landlord
is negligent begins with an analysis of duty.49 Analyzing
whether a duty exists is a question of law for the court to de-
cide." In deciding the existence of duty with respect to a con-
dominium association or landlord for criminal acts of third par-
ties, "[tihe wide range of approaches taken by courts...
5 See, e.g., Centeq Realty, Inc. v. Siegler, 899 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. 1995)
(stating general rule that an individual has no legal obligation to protect another
person from a third party criminal attack). Courts have applied this general rule to
landlords, see Berg v. Allied Sec., 697 N.E.2d 769, 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998), as well as
business owners, see Van Duyn v. Cook Teague Partnership, 694 N.E.2d 779, 781
(Ind. 1998).
4See generally Glesner, supra note 6, at 686-88 (describing how tenants have
brought suits against a landlord based on, inter alia, implied warranty of habitabil-
ity, contract, and tort claims). For example, in Frances T., the plaintiff brought
three causes of actions: negligence, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty.
See Frances T., 723 P.2d at 574.
47 See, e.g., Frances T., 723 P.2d at 587 (reversing dismissal of plaintiff's negli-
gence claim while affirming dismissal of her breach of contract and breach of fiduci-
ary claims); Pamela W., 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 692 n.1 ("ITihe entire complaint stands
or falls with the determination of the negligence cause of action."); see also Glesner,
supra note 6, at 688.
4 See, e.g., Glesner, supra note 6, at 689.
49 See, e.g., Rowe v. State Bank of Lombard, 531 N.E.2d 1358, 1364 (Ill. App. Ct.
1988) (summarizing the required elements for a negligence cause of action: duty,
breach, causation, and injury and stating that absent a duty, there is no recovery as
a matter of law); Walls v. Oxford Management Co., 633 A.2d 103, 104 (N.H. 1993)
(explaining that there can be no negligence without a duty).
0 See, e.g., Cooke v. Allstate Management Corp., 741 F. Supp. 1205, 1207-09
(D.S.C. 1990) (explaining that the duty imposed by the South Carolina Residential
Landlord and Tenant Act is a question of law); Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping
Ctr., 863 P.2d 207, 212 (Cal. 1993) (in bank) (explaining that the contours of the
duty owed by landlords to maintain their land in a reasonably safe condition is a
question of law); Morgan v. Dalton Management Co., 454 N.E.2d 57, 60 (Ill. App. Ct.
1983) (stating that a duty exists only to prevent foreseeable injuries and that
whether such a duty exists is a question of law); Walls, 633 A.2d at 104 (noting
whether exceptions to the general rule that individuals will not be held liable for the
criminal acts of third parties is a question of law); Holt v. Reproductive Servs., Inc.
946 S.W.2d 602, 606 (Tex. App. 1997) (same); Miller v. Whitworth, 455 S.E.2d 821,
824 (W. Va. 1995) (same).
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establishes only that support can be found for practically any
position."51 In Martinez, the Arizona Supreme Court relied only
on the Restatement, overlooking the conflicting positions on this
very issue.52
A. Special Relationships
While generally an individual is not legally obligated to act
for the benefit of another, the existence of a special relationship
may give rise to such a duty.13 The rationale for imposing an af-
firmative duty to protect another from harm stems from one
party's dependence on the other.M Examples of special relation-
ships are common carrier-passenger, innkeeper-guest, business
owner-invitee, and employer-employee.5 Once a special rela-
tionship has been established, one party receives a right of pro-
tection from the other.
56
1. Landlord-Tenant
Prior to 1970, courts did not view the landlord-tenant rela-
51 Cooke, 741 F. Supp. at 1209 n.1. "The entire issue [of liability] turns on ques-
tions of what is the association's duty to third parties and to its members. The issue
is not one that is clearly established." HYATT, supra note 9, at § 6.03(n), at 346-47.
Moreover, "courts within a single jurisdiction may differ as to the appropriate basis
for liability; even appellate courts have misinterpreted or ignored their own state
supreme court's analysis of the issue." Glesner, supra note 6, at 688 (footnotes omit-
ted).
12 When Arizona courts face a question of first impression, the courts typically
follow the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF LAWS. See Martinez v. Woodmar IV Condo-
minium Homeowners Ass'n, 941 P.2d 218, 220-21 (Ariz. 1997). Relying solely on the
Restatement has been questioned, however. See KEETON ETAL., supra note 1, § 3, at
17 ("The form of the Restatement is perhaps unfortunate, in that it seeks to reduce
the law to a definite set of black-letter rules or principles, ignoring all contrary
authority.... ."). Furthermore, courts may tend to "cite the Restatement when they
are already in agreement with it, and ... ignore it when they are not." Id.
5 See Davenport v. Community Corrections, Inc., 962 P.2d 963, 967-68 (Col.
1998) (en banc); Shields v. Wagman, 714 A.2d 881, 886 (Md. 1998); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 315.
4 See Faheen ex rel. Hebron v. City Parking Corp., 734 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1987) ("The concept of a special relationship exists when one entrusts himself
to the protection of another and relies upon that person to provide a place of
safety."); HYATT, supra note 9, § 6.03(n), at 348 (noting that where courts have
found a special relationship, one party lacked control and was dependent upon the
other).
5See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A. See generally Glesner, supra
note 6, at 703.
56 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315. See generally Glesner, supra
note 6, at 704.
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tionship as a special relationship that would warrant the impo-
sition of a duty on the part of the landlord to protect tenants
from criminal activity." In the landmark case of Kline v. 1500
Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp., 8 the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia imposed a duty upon landlords, at
least in the context of multiple-family urban dwellings, to pro-
vide protection from unreasonable and foreseeable harm based
on the landlord-tenant relationship.59 The court reasoned that
the landlord-tenant relationship existing in a large modern day
apartment complex is analogous to an innkeeper-guest relation-
ship." Thus, based on the facts of the case, the court imposed an
affirmative duty upon landlords to protect tenants.6' The court
in Kline indicated that this duty may extend not only to areas
exclusively under the landlord's control, but to the entire prem-
ises.62 Since the Mine decision, a number of courts have ruled
that the landlord-tenant relationship constitutes a special rela-
tionship.'
" See, e.g., Goldberg v. Housing Auth. of Newark, 186 A.2d 291, 292 (N.J. 1962)
(declining to impose a general duty to protect tenants from criminal activity based
on the relationship).
439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
See id. at 483. The Kline court found that the defendant landlord breached his
duty as a matter of law. See id. at 486-87. The court emphasized the fact that the
landlord was aware of criminal activity taking place on the premises. See id. at 481.
In its rationale, the court discussed the implied warranty of habitability and the
notion of analyzing leases as contracts that had recently been espoused in Javins v.
First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See Kine, 439 F.2d at
481-82. The Kine court found that, based upon the analysis of a lease as a contract,
there was an implied obligation on the part of the landlord to provide protective
measures. See id. at 485.
Some courts have criticized Kine, distinguishing between an implied warranty
of habitability and an implied warranty of protection from criminal acts of third
parties. See Trice v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 302 N.E.2d 207, 209 (Il. App. Ct. 1973)
(concluding that a warranty of habitability and an implied warranty against crimi-
nal acts of third parties are dissimilar); Hall v. Fraknoi, 330 N.Y.S.2d 637, 639-40
(Civ. Ct. 1972) (doubting that tenants imply a right to protection based on payment
of rent).
Furthermore, it should be noted that courts have consistently rejected applying
the warranty of habitability to condominiums. See, e.g., Richard Siegler, An Update
of the Warranty of Habitability, N.Y. L.J., Jul. 1, 1998, at 3 (1998) (discussing how
the warranty of habitability has been applied only to cooperatives by virtue of the
lease).
See Kline, 439 F.2d at 485.
6' See id. at 484.
6 See id. at 482.
63 See, e.g., Patterson v. Deeb, 472 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Young
v. Garwacld, 402 N.E.2d 1045 (Mass. 1980); Samson v. Saginaw Profl Bldg., Inc.,
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Despite the recent expansion by some jurisdictions to clas-
sify the landlord-tenant as a special relationship, courts have, for
the most part, been unwilling to require a landlord to be an in-
surer of a tenant's safety." For this reason, most courts have re-
fused to categorize the landlord-tenant relationship as a special
relationship.65 Thus, while a duty may arise based on specific
circumstances, no duty is imposed based on the existence of the
relationship alone.66
A few jurisdictions that have directly confronted the issue in
the context of condominium associations have stated that no
special relationship exists between a condominium association
and the unit owner.6" In King v. Ilikai Properties, Inc.,68 the In-
termediate Court of Appeals of Hawaii first found that the land-
lord-tenant relationship was not a special relationship.6 The
court then stated that "[w]ith respect to the Association, it is
224 N.W.2d 843 (Mich. 1970). See generally Glesner, supra note 6, at 703-04. In
Francis T., the court did not explicitly recognize or reject the existence of a special
relationship between a condominium association and a unit owner. Instead, the
court discussed whether "a condominium association may properly be held to a
landlord's standard of care as to the common areas under its control" as opposed to
the entire premises. Frances T. v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 723 P.2d 573, 577
(Cal. 1986) (emphasis added).
64 See, e.g., Walls v. Oxford Management Co., 633 A.2d 103, 106 (N.H. 1993);
Miller v. Whitworth, 455 S.E.2d 821, 826 (W. Va. 1995). But see Kline, 439 F.2d at
481 ("The landlord is no insurer of his tenants' safety, but he certainly is no by-
stander.").
6' See, e.g., Deem v. Charles E. Smith Management, Inc., 799 F.2d 944, 945 (4th
Cir. 1986); Cramer ex rel. Zitricki v. Balcor Property Management, Inc., 848 F.
Supp. 1222, 1224 (D.S.C. 1994); Cooke v. Allstate Management Corp., 741 F. Supp.
1205, 1209 (D.S.C. 1990); Rowe v. State Bank of Lombard, 531 N.E.2d 1358, 1364
(Ill. 1988); N.W. v. Amalgamated Trust and Sav. Bank, 554 N.E.2d 629, 633 (Il.
App. Ct. 1990); Petrauskas v. Wexenthaller Realty Management, Inc., 542 N.E.2d
902, 906 (III. App. Ct. 1989); Trice v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 302 N.E.2d 207, 209 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1973); Faheen ex rel. Hebron v. City Parking Corp., 734 S.W.2d 270, 272
(Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Walls, 633 A.2d at 106; Miller, 455 S.E.2d at 825-26.
" See, e.g., Duncavage v. Allen, 497 N.E.2d 433, 438 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (stating
that while a landlord will not be held liable for every crime, prior incidents con-
nected to the premises may impose a duty of reasonable care upon the landlord).
See, e.g., Morgan v. 253 East Delaware Condominium Ass'n, 595 N.E.2d 36, 39
(Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (holding no special relationship exists between a landlord and
tenant or condominium association and unit owner).
68 632 P.2d 657 (Haw. Ct. App. 1981). In King, the plaintiffs were assaulted in a
condominium unit. See id. at 659. The plaintiffs brought a negligence action against
the condominium association and other defendants alleging that defendant's failure
to keep the premises safe proximately caused their injuries. See id.
69 See id. at 661. The King court distinguished Kline in that the landlord in
Kline significantly reduced security from the time the plaintiff entered into the
lease. See id. at 661-62.
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even further removed from the chain [of potential liability] and
suffice to say it had no 'special relationship.' "70 In light of the
fact that the majority of courts have expressly rejected the idea
that the landlord-tenant relationship is a special one, it is rea-
sonable to conclude that the relationship between a condomin-
ium association and a unit owner should not constitute a special
relationship, especially when the few courts that have addressed
the issue in the context of condominiums have reached the same
conclusion.
2. Business Owner-Invitee
The Martinez court justified imposing a duty on the condo-
minium association to make the premises safe from criminal ac-
tivity in part on the assumption that a condominium develop-
ment is a business.7' This reasoning seems to be analogous to
the logic behind attaching liability to the business owner in a
business owner-invitee relationship. The court relied on the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS section 344 which imposes a
duty on "[a] possessor of land who holds it open to the public for
entry for his business purposes."72 Application of this theory of
liability by the Martinez court was a broad leap that the court
failed to support.
The Martinez court also stated that the relationship between
a condominium association and its common areas was similar to
that of a landlord and his/her common areas. If that is so, there
is doubt as to whether a condominium association/landlord can
also be characterized as "a possessor of land who holds it open to
the public" within the meaning of section 344 of the Restate-
ment.74 Further, the common areas of an apartment or condo-
minium complex are "not open to the public" and the general
public is not "expected or invited to gather there for other pur-
70 Id. at 662.
7' See Martinez v. Woodmar IV Condominium Homeowners Ass'n, 941 P.2d 218,
222 n.7 (Ariz. 1997) (in banc). The court noted the applicability of section 344 of the
Restatement and laid out the responsibilities and obligations of a business owner to
the invited public. Specifically, the common areas of a condominium complex are to
be free of harm to the "unit owners, their tenants, and their guests." Id.
' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344. Under the Restatement, liability
will be imposed for injuries resulting from criminal attacks if the possessor of land
failed to exercise reasonable care in discovering the danger or failed to warn of the
danqer. See id.See Martinez, 941 P.2d at 221.
74 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344.
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poses than to visit tenants."75 Finally, tenants and unit owners
"do not live where the world is invited to come.... An apart-
ment building is not a place of public resort."" Because the
common areas of an apartment complex are not considered open
to the public, it is doubtful that the common areas of a condomin-
ium complex can be construed as a place where the public is in-
vited.
B. Violent Crimes Exception
A relatively new basis of landlord liability for criminal acts
of third parties is the violent crimes exception.77 The violent
crimes doctrine is an exception to the general rule of immunity
for the landlord in jurisdictions that do not recognize the land-
lord-tenant relationship as a special relationship.78 Foreseeabil-
ity is the key to establishing a duty and liability.79
The Missouri Court of Appeals, in Faheen ex rel. Hebron v.
City Parking Corp.,8  articulated the elements of the doctrine.
First, some kind of relationship between the plaintiff and defen-
dant must exist.8' Second, the defendant must have been put on
notice as a result of "prior specific incidents of violent crimes on
the premises."82 Finally, the injury to the plaintiff must be of a
75 Feld v. Merriam, 485 A.2d 742, 745 (Pa. 1984). The Restatement expressly
states that liability will be imposed when a member of the public is on the premises
for a business purpose. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344. It is doubtful
that Martinez, as a social guest who was attending a party at the condominium,
came to the complex with a business purpose in mind. But see KEETON ET AL., supra
note 1, § 63, at 439 (stating that a business purpose is not necessarily required).
76 Feld, 485 A2d at 745.
7 This exception has also been termed "overriding foreseeability," Walls v. Ox-
ford Management Co., 633 A.2d 103, 106 (N.H. 1993), and "special facts and circum-
stances," Faheen ex rel. Hebron v. City Parking Corp., 734 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1987).
8 See Faheen, 734 S.W.2d at 272-73 (recognizing the violent crimes exception as
a viable basis for liability in Missouri).
See Glesner, supra note 6, at 703. Foreseeability determines the imposition of
a duty and it establishes proximate cause. See id. Duty is determined by a judge,
thus many cases arising under this exception are dismissed at the outset. See id.
8o 734 S.W.2d 270.
81 See id. at 273. This relationship does not have to be a special relationship.
While Missouri does not recognize the landlord-tenant relationship to be a special
one, the court recognized that a landlord and tenant situation constitutes a
"relationship" for the purposes of the violent crimes exception. See id. at 272. Thus,
that relationship, coupled with other factors, may create a duty to protect from
harm. See id.
2 Id. at 273. The notice can be actual or constructive. See id. at 273-74.
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similar nature to the prior incidents." The justification for im-
posing a duty in these circumstances is that the prior incidents
would lead a reasonable person to take precautions to avoid any
future injury.' Thus, if the elements are satisfied, a duty arises
to take protective measures.
Numerous courts have either criticized or expressly rejected
the violent crimes exception.' Courts have been apprehensive in
imposing an affirmative duty based on foreseeability alone.'
Furthermore, this doctrine seems to be extremely limited in its
application. It only applies to instances in which violent crimes
have occurred and the injury to the plaintiff is similar to the in-
jury suffered by others in prior incidents.
C. Voluntary Assumption
Generally, when a party agrees to affirmatively act for the
benefit of another, the actor has a duty to perform with reason-
able care.' This traditional exception to the common law non-
liability rule still carries force today. 9 In the context of landlord
liability, the question is not whether a landlord owes a general
duty to protect tenants and guests from criminal attacks but,
rather, whether the landlord has assumed a duty to protect.9°
Courts have had to determine whether certain initial security
measures taken by landlords constitute a voluntary undertak-
ing.91 In assessing the scope of the duty, courts generally limit
the duty by the extent of the undertaking.
' See id. at 274.
4 See id.
See Walls v. Oxford Management Co., 633 A.2d 103, 107 (N.H. 1993) (rejecting
overriding foreseeability doctrine as a basis of liability); see also Glesner, supra note
6, at 706 (noting the scarce usage of this doctrine).
88 See, e.g., Miller v. Whitworth, 455 S.E.2d 821, 827 (W. Va. 1995) ("A landlord's
general knowledge of prior unrelated incidents of criminal activity occurring in the
area is not alone sufficient to impose a duty on the landlord.") (emphasis added).
"7See Cooke v. Allstate Management Corp., 741 F. Supp. 1205, 1209-10 (D.S.C.
1990) (stating that tort law imposes a duty to act with due care in general).
" See Pagelsdorfv. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 284 N.W.2d 55, 59 (listing as the fifth
exception to the general common law rule of non-liability, instances in which the
landlord contracted to make repairs and, in doing so, created a duty).
See Walls, 633 A.2d at 106-07 (recognizing imposition of a duty on the land-
lord to act with reasonable care when the landlord undertakes to provide security);
Miller, 455 S.E.2d at 825 (stating that affirmative acts give rise to a duty).
s See Glesner, supra note 6, at 696.
91 See id. at 696-700 (discussing how various courts have ruled on the issue).
2See, e.g., Morgan v. 253 East Delaware Condominium Ass'n, 595 N.E.2d 36, 36
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The question of whether the hiring of security guards is a
voluntary assumption of a duty for which liability may be im-
posed has received mixed treatment. 3 In Dailey v. Housing
Authority for Birmingham District," the Supreme Court of Ala-
bama refused to hold that the defendant "voluntarily assumed
the duty to provide a totally crime-free environment," with re-
spect to ensuring the tenant's safety, by hiring a security guard.95
The court reasoned that holding the defendant liable would
"discourage" landlords from hiring guards.96 In Cross v. Wells
Fargo Alarm Services,97 however, the Illinois Supreme Court
stated that when the Chicago Housing Authority undertook to
hire security guards, it had a duty not to increase the danger to
tenants when the guards were not on duty.9"
In Martinez, the court failed to discuss the possibility of im-
posing a duty on the condominium association based on a volun-
tary undertaking theory. In light of the fact that other jurisdic-
tions have considered this issue based on the hiring of security
guards, the Supreme Court of Arizona should have at least dis-
cussed the issue. The voluntary assumption doctrine is a viable,
acceptable, and reasonable basis for imposing a duty on a negli-
gent actor and has been widely recognized in the legal commu-
nity.
99
(Ill. App. Ct. 1992). In 253 East Delaware, the defendants had hired a doorman to
screen visitors. See id. at 39. When the plaintiff entered the building one evening,
she observed a man talking to the doorman. See id. at 37. The same man attacked
the plaintiff a short time later. See id. at 38. The plaintiff brought suit alleging
breach of a duty based on the defendant's voluntary undertaking to provide security
to its unit owners/tenants. See id. The Appellate Court of Illinois ruled in the defen-
dant's favor as a matter of law. See id. at 39. To support its conclusion, the court
stated that even if the defendants had voluntarily undertaken a duty, that duty was
limited to the extent of the undertaking. See id. Because the doorman was employed
only to screen guests, there was no duty to protect owners/tenants from criminal
attacks. See id.
Compare Dailey v. Housing Auth. for Birmingham Dist., 639 So. 2d 1343 (Ala.
1994) (rejecting contention that defendant voluntarily assumed a duty by hiring
guards) with Cross v. Wells Fargo Alarm Servs., 412 N.E.2d 472 (Il1. 1980) (stating
liability may be imposed when defendant hired security).
639 So. 2d 1343.
Id. at 1346.
Id. See also Glesner, supra note 6, at 699 (noting that if liability is imposed
based on the hiring of security guards, landlords may be discouraged from providing
security).
97 412 N.E.2d 472.
98 See id. at 475.
" See, e.g., The Hindoo, 74 F. Supp. 145, 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) (supporting the
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D. Common Areas
Condominium associations have a duty to maintain the
common areas of the complex.' Similarly, landlords and land-
owners have a duty to maintain the physical conditions in areas
within their exclusive control.'' Whether this duty to maintain
the common areas encompasses a duty to make the premises
safe from foreseeable criminal activity for tenants, unit owners,
and guests is an issue in which there is considerable debate
throughout the country.' 2 In Martinez, the court held that the
association was under a duty of reasonable care to make the
premises safe from dangerous activities.'
1. General Duty to Protect Based on Foreseeability
Since 1970, a number of jurisdictions have imposed upon a
landlord a general duty to make the common areas safe from
foreseeable criminal activity, independent of the existence of any
structural defects on the premises." 4 These courts have found
the landlord's control over the common areas to be a decisive fac-
tor. '5 For example, the court in Frances T. found the associa-
proposition that a voluntary assumption of an undertaking, not otherwise a duty,
will impose liability on a negligent actor for any injuries sustained by another as a
result); Florence v. Goldberg, 375 N.E.2d 763, 766-67 (N.Y. 1978) (holding the City
of New York liable for the negligent actions of police officers afler they voluntarily
assumed a protective and supervisory role).
'0 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1247 (West 1990 & Supp. 1997) ("[Tlhe asso-
ciation is responsible for maintenance, repair and replacement of the common ele-
ments.").
101 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 63, at 440-42.
102 Compare Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207, 212 (Cal. 1993)
(in bank) (stating that the general duty of maintenance in the common areas in-
cludes a duty to protect against foreseeable criminal acts) and Centeq Realty, Inc. v.
Siegler, 899 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. 1995) (same) with Cramer v. Balcor Property
Management, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 1222, 1225 (D.S.C. 1994) (stating that the duty to
maintain the common areas in a reasonably safe condition relates to the physical
condition of the premises) and Gulf Reston, Inc. v. Rogers, 207 S.E.2d 841, 844 (Va.
1974) (same).
10 See Martinez v. Woodmar IV Condominium Homeowners Ass'n, 941 P.2d 218,
222 (Ariz. 1992) (en banc).
10 See, e.g., Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 482 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) (imposing a duty to protect against criminal activity in, inter alia, areas
within the landlord's control); KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 63, at 442-43 (noting
an increase in the number of courts imposing a duty to protect tenants from fore-
seeable criminal activity).
'5 See Lefmark Management Co. v. Old, 946 S.W.2d 52, 53 (Tex. 1997) (stating
that a duty to use reasonable care to protect invitees is imposed on the party who
controls the premises); Centeq Realty, 899 S.W.2d at 197 (explaining that the right
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tion's exclusive control over the common elements, coupled with
the association's awareness of prior crimes, to be dispositive.'O
Courts retaining the traditional classifications of visitors'07 im-
pose a duty on landowners to protect invitees from unreasonably
dangerous conditions on the land. 08
Courts using this doctrine must first decide the issue of fore-
seeability.'09 In determining whether a criminal act was foresee-
able, a court generally has two options: "prior similar incidents"
rule or "totality of the circumstances.""0 When a court applies
the "prior similar incident" rule, the past events must "bear a
sufficient relationship to the incident at issue such that it could
be said that defendants should have known of the likelihood of
its occurrence."' Other courts have criticized the prior incident
doctrine as being too restrictive in its application." Instead,
to control is a factor in determining the issue of whether there is a duty to protect
against unreasonable and foreseeable harm); Holt v. Reproductive Servs., Inc., 946
S.W.2d 602, 606 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) (emphasizing the right to control the premises
as an important factor in determining whether a duty will be imposed).
" See Frances T v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 723 P.2d 573, 579 (Cal. 1986)
(in bank) (concluding that the association, with the same duty as a landlord, was in
control of the premises and therefore owed a duty to protect against crimes of which
the association had notice); see also Mine, 439 F.2d at 483-84 (reasoning that in a
large urban apartment complex, the landlord is in the only and best position to take
protective measures to ensure the safety of his/her tenants).
' Traditionally, in property law, the liability of a landowner was dependent
upon the status of the visitor. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 58, at 393. Differ-
ent duties were imposed depending on whether the individual was an invitee, licen-
see, or trespasser. See id. Based on a "rough sliding scale," a landowner owed an
invitee the highest standard of care followed by a licensee, and finally, a trespasser.
Id. Recently, however, a growing number of courts have abolished the distinction
among visitors and instead, imposed a general duty of reasonable care. See id. § 62,
at 432-34.
10 See Stanley v. Town Square Coop., 512 N.W.2d 51, 53, 55 (Mich. Ct. App.
1993) (finding that a cooperative association is analogous to a landlord, and thus,
has a duty to protect against unreasonably dangerous conditions of land and to pro-
tect both tenants and invitees from criminal acts of third parties); at 54 (discussing
visitors as invitees of landlords because part of the rent paid to landlord's is consid-
eration for permission to have visitors on the premises).
"9 See, e.g., Frances T., 723 P.2d at 578-79 (discussing the importance of fore-
seeability for the determination of liability).
110 See Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207, 214-15 (Cal. 1993)
(in bank) (discussing both options).
.. Polomie v. Golub Corp., 640 N.Y.S.2d 700, 701 (App. Div. 1996) (finding that
prior incidents of solicitation and harassment were not sufficient to put the defen-
dant on notice to prevent the robbery and sexual assault that caused plaintiff's in-
juries); see also Mline, 439 F.2d at 481 (emphasizing defendant's knowledge of prior
similar assaults and robberies).
1 See Isaacs v. Huntington Meml Hosp., 695 P.2d 653, 665 (Cal. 1985)
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these jurisdictions apply the "totality of the circumstances" doc-
trine and look at other factors in addition to prior incidents to
determine whether the plaintiff's injury was foreseeable."3 For
example, courts may take into account prior crimes of a lesser
nature than the one plaintiff alleges."4
Courts must also determine whether foreseeability relates to
duty, proximate cause, or both. The Martinez court stated that
foreseeability is irrelevant as to whether a duty exists." 5 Rather,
foreseeability, according to the court, only defined the scope of
the duty."6 While jurisdictions agree that foreseeability does
partly determine the scope of a duty of care," 7 most jurisdictions
would probably disagree with Arizona's conclusion that foresee-
ability is not relevant in determining if a duty should be im-
(criticizing the prior similar incident rule because victims initially injured are pre-
cluded from recovery).
'3 See id. at 655-56 (noting that the premises was in a high crime area, the
lights were not working, and prior crimes of a different nature had occurred). It
should be noted that the California Supreme Court has changed its position since
the Isaacs decision. See Ann M., 863 P.2d at 214-16. Because of increased criminal
activity regularly occurring in society, the court felt the rule in Isaacs needed
"refinement." Id. at 215. In deciding whether the defendant had a duty to provide
security guards, the court "conclude[d] that the requisite degree of foreseeability
rarely, if ever, can be proven in the absence of prior similar incidents of violent
crime on the landowner's premises." Id; see also Pamela W. v. Millsom, 30 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 690, 695 (Ct. App. 1994) (requiring a "high degree of foreseeability" to be
proven before imposing a duty to hire security guards upon the landlord and con-
dominium association).
114 See Frances T., 723 P.2d at 579 (emphasizing the defendant's knowledge of
burglaries that occurred prior to the plaintiff's rape); Czerwinsld v. Sunrise Point
Condominium, 540 So. 2d 199, 201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that proof of
lesser crimes is relevant in determining foreseeability). When courts analyze prior
incidents, location becomes important. Compare Admiral's Port Condominium Ass'n,
Inc. v. Feldman, 426 So. 2d 1054, 1055 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (declaring that
prior crimes committed off the premises, while similar, are not probative with re-
spect to foreseeability) with Czerwinski, 540 So. 2d at 201 (explaining that prior
crimes need not be in the same location as the later crime in order to be probative
on the issue of foreseeability).
"sl See Martinez v. Woodmar IV Condominiums Homeowners Ass'n, 941 P.2d
218, 223 (Ariz. 1997) ("The type of foreseeable danger did not dictate the existence
of duty but only the nature and extent of the conduct necessary to fulfill the duty.").116 See id.
17 See, e.g., Ann M., 863 P.2d at 215 (explaining that in determining the scope of
duty, foreseeability is weighed against the burden the duty imposes); Lefmark Man-
agement Co. v. Old, 946 S.W.2d 52, 58-59 (Tex. 1997) (Owen, J., concurring) (noting
that foreseeability is a factor in determining the nature of a duty); Pamela W., 30
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 695 ('[A] high degree of foreseeability is required in order to find...
the scope of a landlord's duty.").
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posed. 8 It is stated that "foreseeability is a crucial factor in de-
termining the existence of duty.""' For example, in Admiral's
Port Condominium Ass'n v. Feldman,'12 a Florida District Court
of Appeal stated that the duty of care to protect against criminal
acts of third parties is dependent upon the foreseeability of
criminal activity.' 2' Furthermore, in Knauss v. DND Neffson
Co.,122 an Arizona case following Martinez, the court questioned
Martinez's conclusion regarding duty and foreseeability.' The
court noted, under "Martinez, foreseeability is not a relevant fac-
tor in the threshold legal determination of duty."' The court
also stated "[i]f our interpretation [of Martinez] is correct, how-
ever, that proposition seems to conflict with prior pronounce-
ments of the [Arizona] supreme court and court of appeals. It
also varies from the approach other states have taken in similar
cases."" Given the great weight of authority indicating that
foreseeability is a necessary factor in determining the existence
of a duty, it is contended that the Martinez court erred in its
analysis.
2. Duty to Maintain is Limited to Physical Condition of Premises
At the other end of the spectrum, there are a number of
118 See, e.g., Lefmark, 946 S.W.2d at 59 (Owen, J., concurring) ("Foreseeability is
a consideration to be weighed by the court in determining if a duty is owed.. .
(emphasis added).
"Ann M., 863 P.2d at 214 (emphasis added). See Lefmark, 946 S.W.2d at 59
(Owen, J., concurring) (" '[Wihatever duty a lessor may have,' there can be no duty
in the absence of a foreseeable risk of harm from violent crime on the premises")
(quoting Walker v. Harris, 924 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex. 1996)); KEETON ET AL., supra
note 1, § 63, at 443 n.16 ("There is of course no duty to prevent criminal attacks that
are unforeseeable. ").
120 426 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
121 See id. at 1054.
122 963 P.2d 271 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997).
123 See id. at 275 n.4. In Knauss, the decedent was abducted from the shopping
mall parking lot where she worked. See id. at 272-73. A wrongful death action was
brought against the mall owners/operators, as well as others. See id. at 272 Al-
though the defendants claimed they owed no common law duty because the crime
was not foreseeable, the court, relying on Martinez, stated "[n]otwithstanding the
allegedly unforeseeable criminal acts against her, Martinez compels the conclusion
that... the mall defendants owed her a common law duty to use 'reasonable care to
prevent harm from criminal intrusion' while using the mall's common area." Id. at
275 (quoting Martinez v. Woodmar IV Condominiums Homeowners Ass'n, 941 P.2d
218, 222) (Ariz. 1997).
124 Id. at 275 n.4.
125 Id. (citations omitted).
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courts that do not impose a general duty on landlords to make
the common areas safe from foreseeable criminal activity.' In-
stead, these jurisdictions state that the landlord's duty to main-
tain the common areas is limited to the physical condition of the
land.' 7 The rationale generally given is that a landlord does not
have the duty to police the premises and a landlord is not an in-
surer of safety.2 Some courts reason that expanding the duty to
maintain the physical conditions "to include a duty to protect
against criminal activity would stretch it well beyond its current
limits and change the landlord/tenant relationship dramati-
cally.",2
9
Even within these jurisdictions, however, liability may be
imposed upon the landlord if a physical defect caused or en-
hanced criminal acts on the premises.' Under this theory, a
duty to use reasonable care may arise when "prior incidents
similar to the one complained of and which are connected with
the physical condition" occur on the premises.11 The prior inci-
'2" See Cramer v. Balcor Property Management, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 1222, 1225
(D.S.C. 1994) (limiting liability of a landlord to specific circumstances occurring in
common areas).
' See id; Cooke v. Allstate Management Corp., 741 F. Supp. 1205, 1211 (D.S.C.
1990) (stating that the landlord's duty to maintain common areas involves keeping
premises in good repair and liability only arises for injuries resulting from danger-
ous conditions of the premises); Gulf Reston, Inc. v. Rogers, 207 S.E.2d 841, 844 (Va.
1974) (same).
'2 See Trice v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 302 N.E.2d 207, 210 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973);
Gulf Reston, 207 S.E.2d at 844. Applying Virginia law, the Fourth Circuit, in Deem
v. Charles E. Smith Management, Inc., 799 F.2d 944 (4th Cir. 1986), noted that in
Virginia there is a distinction between "promot[ing] tenant safety" and protecting
tenants from criminal acts. Id. at 946.
i9 Cooke, 741 F. Supp. at 1211; see also Cramer, 848 F. Supp. at 1225. The court
in Cooke distinguished structural defects in the premises and criminal activity by
third persons. See Cooke, 741 F. Supp. at 1211 ("Criminal activity is a completely
different type of danger than rotting stairways.. ").
"" See generally Glesner, supra note 6, at 690-93 (cataloguing defects that dif-
ferent jurisdictions have used as the basis of imposing liability).
131 Duncavage v. Allen, 497 N.E.2d 433, 438 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986). See Stribling v.
Chicago Hous. Auth., 340 N.E.2d 47 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975). In Stribling, the plaintiff-
tenant alleged negligence on the part of the landlord, Chicago Housing Authority,
for failing to secure the two vacant apartments adjacent to the tenant. The plaintiff
had become aware that individuals had gained access to the vacant apartments
without authority. See id. at 48-49. Plaintiffs requests to secure the apartments
went unheeded and plaintiffs apartment was subsequently burglarized. See id. at
49. The criminals had gained access to plaintiffs apartment via the adjacent apart-
ments. See id. Because the defendants did not remedy the problem after notice of
the first burglary, plaintiffs apartment was burglarized two more times. See id. The
Appellate Court of Illinois held that while defendant did not owe plaintiff a duty
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dents, however, need not be identical to the plaintiffs injury.12
Liability may also arise when a landlord's acts or omissions
foreseeably increase the risk of crime."'3 This duty stems from
the general rule that an individual whose acts or omissions have
created the possibility of harm must take steps to reduce the
risk.'" Courts have been most willing to impose a duty when the
landlord's negligent acts or omissions facilitated unauthorized
entrance." For example, the Appellate Court of Illinois in Dun-
cavage v. Allen... reversed dismissal of plaintiffs complaint
where exterior lights of the apartment complex were burned out;
the landlord had permitted weeds to grow so high as to allow an
individual to hide; and a ladder was left out which had previ-
ously been used to gain entry to another tenant's apartment
which was burglarized.1 7  The court found these factors were
sufficient to allege breach of the landlord's duty to maintain the
common areas which may have proximately caused plaintiffs
injury.138
It is contended that a duty should be imposed on a condo-
minium association when there is a physical defect in the com-
mon areas that causes criminal activity, the association's act or
with respect to the first burglary, a duty to protect subsequently arose, making the
landlord liable for the second and third burglaries. See id. at 50.
132 See Petrauskas v. Wexenthaller Realty Management, Inc., 542 N.E.2d 902,
906 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (noting that while the present and past crimes need not be
identical, the risk causing plaintiffs injury must have been present during the prior
crimes); Glesner, supra note 6, at 707 (explaining that the majority of jurisdictions
only require that the prior incidents be sufficient to "provide notice of future crimi-
nal activity" to the landlord).
1 3 See, e.g., Rowe v. State Bank of Lombard, 531 N.E.2d 1358, 1368 (Il. 1988)
(recognizing the existence of a duty where "the defendant's acts or omissions create
a condition conducive to a foreseeable intervening criminal act"); Cross v. Wells
Fargo Alarm Servs., 412 N.E.2d 472, 475 (IMI. 1980) (reversing dismissal of com-
plaint where defendant allegedly increased the risk of criminal activity); Miller v.
Whitworth, 455 S.E.2d 821, 821, 827 (W. Va. 1995) (imposing duty when defendant's
acts or omissions create risk of criminal activity).
134 See Walls v. Oxford Management Co., 633 A.2d 103, 106-07 (N.H. 1993)
(pointing out that "a landlord who undertakes... to provide security will thereafter
have a duty to act with reasonable care").
'35 See, e.g., Rowe, 531 N.E.2d at 1369 (finding that defendant's knowledge of
missing keys, coupled with prior criminal activity, may give rise to a duty); Glesner,
supra note 6, at 691 ("Conditions such as broken or missing locks, missing pass keys
and easily accessible ladders or fire escapes seem more likely to produce liabil-
ity. ... ") (footnotes omitted).
'38 497 N.E.2d 433 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)
3 See id. at 437.
138 See id.
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omissions enhances criminal activity, or the association volun-
tarily assumes a duty to protect. Given the condominium's
unique form of ownership, these are the most appropriate bases
for imposing liability on a condominium association. The Su-
preme Court of Arizona should have adopted one of these theo-
ries, rather than imposing an extremely broad rule on the asso-
ciation. The court would have probably reached the same
conclusion in this specific case.
CONCLUSION
Through the Martinez decision, the Supreme Court of Ari-
zona "has rushed headlong into an unnecessary expansion of tort
duties that adds to the already dubious reach of this infinitely
expandable part of our common law.""9 Given the nature and
form of a condominium, and in light of the fact that a significant
number of jurisdictions have refused to expand the liability of a
landlord in the context of protecting tenants and guests, it seems
unreasonable and illogical to expand a condominium associa-
tion's liability in such a broad manner. Unlike a tenant, a unit
owner has the opportunity, through statutory rights and voting
power, to effect desired changes. Moreover, viable alternatives
are available for plaintiffs in situations where an association is
negligent. The Martinez decision reaches beyond any reasonable
standard. A decision that has such significant ramifications
should not be made by a court of law but, rather, by the legisla-
ture or the parties themselves.
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'39 Payne, supra note 9, at 370.
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